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INTRODUCTION
The boy divided his attention between the black clouds
forming in the sky above the beach and his intricate sand
castle.

Only when the rain began filling his elaborate

mote did he rise reluctantly and trot towards home.
When the rain subsided two hours later, the boy,
having been grounded for his wet and sandy appearance,
convinced his younger brother to go to the beach and guard
his sand castle.

When the brother arrived on the beach,

however, he found that another boy had confiscated his
brother's property and was building ugly little huts around
the beautiful castle.

"What are you doing to my castle?"

demanded the brother, assuming his older brother's role of
ownership.

"I've been here for an hour," replied the pres-

ent occupant, staring defiantly.

"Where have you been?"

Both boys stood their ground, refusing to yield an inch of
sand .
This scenario represents the problem of right and
wrong in today's world.
right.

Most people view themselves as

In the words of an Israeli social scientist , "'Per-

ceptions are as important as reality if decision-makers
•

operate on the basis that their perceptions are reality.'

5

6

Actions and policies are made on the understanding of perceived reality." 1
Israel and the United States believe that the Israelis
have the right to exist as a nation and that the Palestinians do not have this right.

The Palestinians believe that

Israel, with the help of the Untied States, has usurped their
land, and that they, the Palestinians , have the right to
2
self-determination and statehood .
Who, then, is right, and who is wrong?

The writer of

this paper believes that Israel's right to statehood has
been used to justify the snff ering of the Palestinians .
When right
wrong.

is ~ used

to sanction another's misery, it becomes

Therefore, hoping that she may strengthen an unpop-

ular position, the writer of this paper will look with Palestinian eyes at the official positions of the United States ,
Israel, and the frontline Arab states of Egypt , Lebanon,
Syria , and Jordan regarding the issue of the Palestinian
right to self-determination and statehood.
It is necessary to clarify some basic terminology used
in this paper.

The term "Palestine" will refer to the area

known as Mandate Pa le stine .

This does not include the area

now known as Jordan, but does include the Israeli-occupied
1As quoted by John Edwin Mroz in Beyond Security:
Private Perceptions Among Arabs and Israeli at, ... ( New Tt)rk:
International Peace Academy, Inc., 19 80 ~- , p.27
2 self-determination is a "decision by a territorial
unit as to its future political status .'', 2nd ed. (1949),
s . v. "Self-determination."

territories known as the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and
the Golan Heights.

The term "Palestinian 11 will refer to

those persons who are or were refugees of Palestine.

The

term "Middle East 11 will refer to the region consisting of
Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, Yemem (Aden), and Yemen ( Sana ) . 3
To understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one
must first

h ~ve

a historical knowledge of the conflict.

This paper will overview the history of Palestine before
and during the British mandate of 1922 and the history of
the Palestinians after Israel became a state in 1948.

3For

a map of the Middle East, see page
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PART I:

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Chapter

I.

PALESTINE BEFORE THE BRITISH MANDArE
( 3500 B.C.-A. D. 1922)

II.

PALESTINE DURING THE BR:TISH MANDArE
(1922- 194 7 )

III. THE PALESTINIANS AFTER THE PROCLAMATION
OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
(1948-19 84 ~

CHAPTER I :
PALESTINE DURING THE BRITISH MANDATE
(3500 B.C.-A.D. 1922)
The Jews first moved to Palestine around 1900 B.C.
They remained there until the Babylonians forced them into
exile in 586 B. C.

When the Persian king, Cyrus, conquered

Babylonia 50 years later, he allowed the Jews to return to
Palestine .

In 63 B.C., the Romans invaded Palestine, then

known as Judah, and it became a part of the Roman Empire.
Conflicts occurred when the Jews desired autonomy , and the
Romans forced the Jews to flee in fear of persecution, leaving only a small minority of Jews in Palestine .
The Arabs came to Palestine around 3500 B.C.

They

conq uered the area of Palestine in the A. D. 600's in order
to spread their newly adopted Islamic religion .

Other peop-

les, including Turkish Seljuks , European Christian crusaders,
followers of the Muslim Saladin, and Egyptian Mamelukes,
controlled Palestine until the Ottoman Turks seized power
in A.D • . 1517. 4
The majority of the :Palestinians under Ottoman rule
were Arabs and could be divided into two basic classes:
the Fellaheen or peasantry and the Madiyeen or townspeople.
90~

of the Palestinian Arabs were fellaheen and lived

in villages on communally owned lands.

Land, family , and

4world Book Encylopedia, s .v. "Palestine," 1984
10

11

village were vitally important to them.

Each __village had

a council of elders to decide important matters for the
people.

Because the Ottomans lacked a strong state , the

fellaheen became accustomed to defending their villages
against frequent raids by desert-dwellers called Bed oui ns .
These village-centered activities developed a national
consciousness in the Palestinian Arabs, which would later
grow into a desire for statehood .
The life of the fellaheen was relatively stable until
1858 when the Tanzimat or Land Code was introduced in order
to save the crumbling Ottoman Empire.

The land reform re-

quired the registration of land and the monitization of
taxes:.

The Arab peasants, who owned their lands communally,

realized that individual ownership would prevent village
people from allocating new land . to their sons, and that
there was a possibility of increased taxea for individuals.
In order to preserve their way of life, the peasant s sold
their land to the townspeople with the agreement that the
fellaheen would control distribution of the land.
worked until the
tant notables.

townsp~ople

This

began to sell the land to dis-

The new owners charged high tenancy fees

which the peasants could not pay, forcing the peasants from
the land. 5
In the late nineteenth century, Jews be ga n steadily
movine into that part of the Ottoman Empire called Palestine .
r.::

?Mart in Ziebell, "Pq,verty and Culture," Earlham Co lle ge ,
June 2 , 1983

12

What caused them to leave their homes, and why did they come
to Palestine?
The Jews came to Palestine to escape persecution, and
many came as a result of Zionist movement.
forms:

cultural, religious, and political.

Zionism had many
Theodore Herzl,

the founder of political Zionism, promoted the colonization
of Palestine

~nd

sciousness.

In 1897, he formed a Zionist Congress whose aim

the strengthening of a Jewish national con-

was "to create for the Jew.ish people a home in Palestine
6
secured by public law."
The Jews chose Palestine as their home for natural
reasons:

the Jewish lifestyle was saturated with references

to Palestine, the Hebrew language was common th both European
and Palestinian Jews, and, at one time, the Jews were autonomous in Palestine.

Also, the Jews claimed biblical rights

to Palestine.
Early in the twentieth century, the Jews saw their
chance to obtain approval by law for a Jewish homeland in
Palestine.

The British had gained control of the Suez Canal

and showed interest in surrounding lands.

After the begin-

ning of World War I, Theodore Herzl began talking to British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur James Balfour
about the possibility of a Jewish homeland

~n

Palestine.

The result of thBse negotiations was the issuance of the
6 charles R. Gellner, The Palestine Problem, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, Public Affairs Bulletin No.
50' 19 4 7) ' p. 3

13
Balfour Declaration in October of 1917.

The declaration

read as follows:
His Majesty's Government view with favour the
establishmant in Palestine of a nationa l home for
the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours
to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being
clearly understood that nothing sha ll be done which
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine , or the rights
and poli1ical status enjoyed by Jews in any other
country.
The phraseology of this declaration was purposefully vague.

For example, th ere was no precedent for the

term "national home"; hence, in t erpretations of the term
varied.

Many people believed the term to be the equivalent

to "state" or "commonwealth".
Another carefully worded phrase read, '' ••• it being
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing nonJewish communities in Pa le s tine ••• "

It is import ant to

note that the declaration only guaranteed th e "civil" and
"religious" rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

It failed to mention their political rights.

Later,

however, when British Commander David G. Ho garth was sent
to explain the Ba lfour Declaration to King Hussein, the
leader o f the Arabs , Hogarth assure·d the king that "Jewish
settlement in Pa le stine would only be allowed in so far as
would be consistent with the political and economic freedom
of the Ara b population." 8 The fact that Hogarth used the
7 Ibid, p . 6
8

Ibid , p.11

14
term "political" instead of "civil" seemem to be an inconsistency in British policy .
King Hussein's reply, on behalf of the Arabs, was that
he would provide a refuge for th e Jews, but that Ara b sovereignty over Pa l es tine would n ot be surrendered .
The Jewish reaction to the Ba lfour Dec l aration was made
cl~ar

when the Bri tish Zionists held a celebration in the

London Opera Houae .

During the ga la, a Dr . Gaster stated

that it was th e Zionists'

job to assign a meaning to the

term "nati onal home" which woul d be closest to the original
meaning decided upon by the First Zionist Congress .

That

meaning , according to Dr . Gaster , was the es t ablishment of
an " ••• aut onomous Jewish Commonwealth in the fullest sense
of the word . "9
The American reaction was summed up by President
Wilson's statement that '' ••• our Government and people are
agreed that in Pales t ine there shal l be l a id the foundations
of a Jewish Commonwealth ." 10

The United S tates government

was interpreting the term "national home" in a way favorable
to the Zi onists .
9Ibid , p .1 0
10

Ibid, p.14

CHAPTER II
PALESTINE DURING THE BRITI SH MANDATE
(1922-1947)
After World War I, disputes arose concerning promises
made to the Arabs by Great Bri tain before the war.

In order

to persuade the Arab world to aid them in defeating Turkey,
the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon,
promised that Great Bri tain would recognize Arab independence in certain Arab territories.

In a letter written to

King Hussein in October, 1915, McMahon agreed that the boundaries would be " ••• the Red .Sea--Indian Ocean--Persian Gulf
line, Persia on the east, the Mediterranean on the west and
what is roughly the present southern boundary of Turkey on
11
the north .''
There would, .however, be these exceptions:
"The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of
Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns,
Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab , and must
on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation ••• ''
The Arabs believed the proposed independent territory to inelude Palestine and entered the war on this account.

It was

McMahon's intention, however, to exclude Palestine from the
delimitation, and he believed that King Hussein understood
this.

He later made a public statement to that effect.
11 Ibid, p.16
12

Ibid, p .17
15<

12

16
Despite these disputes, Great Britain found herself
in military occupation of Palestine after the war and something had to be done with the ungoverned territory.

At the

Peace Conference in Paris on January 18, 1919, the newlycreated League of Nations adopted the mandates system to
administer territories detached from Germany and Turkey during
the war.

Under this system, occupied territories would be

managed by various Allied Powers, presumably until these
territories could gain autonomy.

Palestine became a man-

date of Great Britain in 1922.
There are two documents which are important in discerning opinions about the Palestine problem at the time of
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

The first appeared in

a report to the American Peace Conference delegation by the
Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence .
It reccommended that the League of Nations recognize Palestine as a Jewish state as soon as it became a Jewish state
in fact.

It further stated that, "It is right that Palestine

should become a Jewish state, if the Jews, being given full
13
opportunity, make it such . "
The second document relevant to opinion at the time
of the Peace Conference was written by Henry C. King and
Charles R. Crane , after they had been sent by President
Wilson to investigate Near Eastern sentiment concerning
the Palestine problem .

Although their report reached the

conference too late to have any effect on it, the results

~ 3Ibid, p . 26

17
of their investigation opposed an extreme Zionist program
for Palestine.

The King-Crane Commissi on reported that

'' ••• 'a national home for the Jewish people' is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State;

nor can

the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the 'civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine .'"
A fact that came out repeatedly in the Commissi on's conference wi th Jewish representatives was that the Zi oni sts
looked frirward to a practically complete dispossession of
the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine by various
forms of land purchase.
11

•• •

Said the King-Crane Commission,

it is to be remembered that the non-~ewish population

of Palestine--nearly nine-tenths of the whole--are emphatically against the entire Zionist program.

The tables show

that there was no one thing upon which the population of
Palestine were more agreed than upon this ••• n 14
The Arab dissatisfaction mentioned by the King-Crane
Commission was revealed in a public way when , in 1921, frustrated Arabs rioted in Jaffa and other areas of Palestine.
The Arabs argued that the increasing Jewish immigration was
causing too great a decrease in lands and jobs available to
Arabs .

As a result of this complaint, British Prime Minister

Winston Churchill officially enunciated British policy concerning immigration into Palestine .
14 I."bid, p.27

Churchill said that

18
the immigration could not be so great that Palestine could
not absorb settlers into its economy .
After Churchill discussed the immigration policy, he
went on to talk about the establishment of a constitution
in Palestine .

In connection with this, he officially set-

tled the McMahen-Hussein dispute of 1915 by saying that the
boundaries of Arab independence definately excluded Palestine .
When the United States heard Churchill's statement on
Pa l estine , it felt that an official declaration of Congress
concerning the problem of Palestine was in order .

The reso-

lution, which was signed by the President in September of
1922, stated that the United S tates favored the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people
but that nothing should be done to prejudice the rights of
Christians and oth er non-Jewish communities in Pa lestine.
This resolution sparked Amer ican interest in the problem of
Palestine .
Since the United States refused to participate in the
League of Nations , they were not invited to join the negotiations concerning the mandates.

Nevertheless, the U.S.

State Department insisted that the United Sta tes had rights
in these mandated territories due to the fact that the U.S.
had participated in the war and was a contributor to its
success .

In 1924, an agreement was signed by the United

States and Great Britain concerning the administration of
the mandate of Palestine .
15 Ibid , p.32

Great Britain would administrate

15

19
the mandate and would modify the mandate if necessary.

The

United States could decline to accept as applicable to American interests any modifications damaging those interests.
After the mandate policies were determined, there was
another problem to which the British turned their attention.
Great Britain had promised Arab independence in certain territories, and the area lying east of the Jordan River was
within the boundaries of these territories.

In 1922, the

British government, with the approval of the League af Nations, exempted Trans-jordan from the mandate clauses dealing
with the Jewish national home.
to acquire land in Trans-jordan.

No Jews have been allowed
In 1946, Trans-jordan,

now known as Jordan, became a state.

16

In 1925 and 1926, when the amount of Jewish immigrants
entering Palestine was greater than its absorbing capacity,
argument arose from the Arabs concerning this problem of Jewish immi gra tion.

Later, in 1928, these arguments erupted

into Jewish and Arab rioting, when it was believed that religious rights were violated a t the Wa iling Wa ll, a shrine
sacred to Jews and Ara b s alike.

Approximately 200 deaths

occurred during the rioting.
A commis s ion of inquiry was charged by th e British to
investi ga t e the cause of the riots.

Among the se causes, the

commission, led by Sir Wa lter Shaw , listed the problem of
land ownership and tenancy.
16

Ibid, p.32-39

According to the Shaw Commission,

20
" ••• between 1921 and 1929, as a result of large sales of
land, Arab tenants were being evicted from their holdings." 17
This was partially due to the Land Code of 1858.

Other land

was being sold to ' the Jews by wealthy landowners and Arab
peasants who sold part of their land and used the money
gained to increase the value of the remaining land. 18 As
a result of its investigation, the Shaw Commission reccommended that His Ma j esty ' s Government should issue a clear
statement of policy to be pursued in Palestine .
The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of
Nations also had something to say regarding the rioting in
Palestine .
~llowing

The

Commiss~ ~n

reprimanded Great Britain for

the outbreak and redefined the essence of the man-

date for Palestine .

The objects of the mandate were:

"The

establishment of the Jewish National Home" and "The establishment of self-governing institutions ••• " 19 The immediate
obligation of Great Britain was to place Palestine under
such conditions to make possible the objects of the mandate .
Pressure from the Mandates Commission led Great Britain to issue the White Paper of 1930.

This Paper stressed

that despite some Zionist claims that the primary role of
17 Ibid, p . 69
18 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great
Britain and Palestine , 1915-194 5, 3rd ed., (London and
New York : Hyperion Press, Inc., 1946), p.57
1 9Gellner, The Palestine Problem, p .7 2

21

the mandate was to create a Jewish national home, the British
government still held that the rights of the non-Jewish population had equal importance.

Said the Paper, any power

given the Jewish Agency, the Jews' representative body, was
permissive and not obligatory.

The Paper further noted that:.,

as there was only 6,554 ,000 dunums of cultivable land in
Palestine, there was no land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants.

The Jewish Agency was criticized

for employing only Jews to meet its labor needs.
The Jewish reaction to the 1930 Whi t e Paper was extremely negative .

Dr . Chaim Weizmann,

~

Jewish leader and

later the first president of the state of Israel , resigned
from the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency.

Others

claimed that the White Paper violated the mandate.
In February, 1931, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald issued a statement to clatify the White Paper .

In

it, he said that although the civil rights of non-Jewish
people in Palestine must be safeguarded, this did not mean
that these civil rights were to remain unchanged .
same way, "the words of article 6,

In the

'ensuring that the rights

and position of other sections of the population are not
prejudiced,' were not considered a barrier to Jewish immi20
gration and settlement .n
MacDonald also stated that the
right of the Jewish Agency to employ only Jewish labor would
be recognized.
20

Ibid, p.78

22
Although the Jews were happy with the clarification
of the 1930 White Paper , the Arabs felt that MacDonald's
statement nullified the purpose of the 1930 document .
By 1935, five Arab parties had been formed , but there
was no one body representative of all of the Arabs .

In

November, 1935 , these five parties placed three demands
before the British High Commissioner:

"1)establishment

of a democratic government; 2 )no more Arab land transfers
to Jews; and 3 ) immediate cessation of Jewish immigration
and the formation of a committee to determine the absorp21
tive capacity of the country ."
When these demands were not met to the satisfaction
of the Arabs , an Arab National Committee was formed in
1936, calling for a general strike .

In April of the same

year , all Arab parties formed an Arab Higher Committee
whose president was Haj Amin El Husseini, the Mufti of
Jerusalem.

This committee calle d for a continuance of the

general strike and the implementation of the three demands
placed before the British High Commissioner .
A Royal Commission, of which William Robert Wellesley,
Earl Peel, was chairman was appointed to investigate the
causes of th e 1936 disturbances and to make reccommendations
concerning these causes .
The Peel Commission listed two underlying causes for
the 1936 disturbances:

"1)The desire of the Arabs for nat-

ional independence, and 2)Their hatred and fear of the estab21

Ibid, p . 82

23
lishment of the Jewish National Home."
reccommendation was to create
for the Jews and the Arabs.

separ~t~

22

Their primary

states in Palestine

The Jews would have a state

in the north and west while the Arabs would have a state
in the south and east and would be joined to Trans-jordan.
The Jewish reaction caused a split in the Jewish
Agency, as half favored and half opposed the partition.
The Arab reaction was one of united disapproval.
The partition plan was finally pronounced impracticable by the British in 1938.
Another outcome of the 1936 disturbances was the
British decision to dissolve the Arab Hieher Committee.
Warrants of arrest were issued for six of its members, who,
subsequently, fled or were deported to neighboring countries.
In May, 1939, British Prime Minister MacDonald published another White Paper concetning Palestine.

The Paper

was divided under the headings of constitution, immigration,
and land.

Concerning the constitution, MacDonald said that

it was not the intention of Great Britain " ••• that Palestine
should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of
the Arab population of the country ••• His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part
of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State."

23

The- Prime Minister went on to say that neither would Palestine
be an Arab state, but that it would be ruled equally by both.
22

Ibid, p.83

23 Ibid, p.99

24
The future government of Pa l estine would be established in ten years, in which tim e the Jews and Arabs of
Palestine would be given grea ter authority .

At the end of

a transitional period, a representa tiv e body of Arabs and
Jews would make reccommendations regarding the constitution
of an independent Palestinian state .
Regarding Jewish immi grati on, the British stated that
they believed indefinate immigration would cause a permanant enmity between the Arabs and the Jews.

Therefore , the

Arabs would decide the fate of future .immigration .
However , for various reasons Jewish immigration could
not be cut off immediately, so the British arrived at the
following formula:

75,000 immigrants would be allowed to

ent er Palestine within the next five years .

They would be

admitted at the rate of 10,000 per year for the next five
years .

25,000'refugees from the war would be admitted when

their maintenance could be insured .

After this five years,

no Jewish immigrants would be admitted unless by approval
of the Palestinian Arabs.
In reference to land, the Paper stated that in some
areas land transfer to Jews was to b e restric t ed while in
24
other areas , land transfer was to be stopped altogether .
In reaction to the 1939 White Paper , the Arab Higher
Committee , who had continued despite British opposition,
forma ll y denounced the Briti§h po li cy and again demanded
the cessati on of Jewish immigration .
24 Ibid , p . 99-102

25
The Jewish Agency also rejected the White Paper.
They stated that they had been deprived of their last
hope. 25

Because of the Whi te Paper, Jewish resistance to

the g overnm ent greatly increased.

A reign of terror in

the form of bombing.s, murders, robberies, arson, and wreckings swept acr os s Palestine.

Illegal armed forces were

organized, the most radical being the S tern gang , who, in
1944, murdered Lord Mayne , the British Minister Resident
in th e Middle East .
Jewish terrorism came to an abrupt halt at the st art
of World War II in September , 1939.

Realizing the danger

.
t Hl. tl er .
of Nazis m, the Jews joined the British fight aga1ns

26

Illegal immigration grew enormously during the war.
Acc ording to the 1tlhi te Paper of 1939, illegal immigrants
would be subtracted from the regular quota laid down by l aw .
On this basis, the British filled the regular quota with
illegal immigrants for three periods during 1940 and 1941.
For a time, deportation was utilized.
As the circumstances of the war changed, the Jews were
unable to fill their immigration quotas.

By September , 1943,

only 43,922 immigrants had entered Palestine .

The five-year

period in which 75,000 immigrants were to enter Palestine
would end in March of 1944.

That the remaining number of

immi grants should not be allowed to enter due to the time
factor seemed unfair to the Bri tish.
2 5Ibid, p.103-104
26 Ibid, p.108-109

Hence , the time was

26
ext ended ind efinat e ly until the quota should be fi lled.
Due to the deaths of six mi llion Jews and the persecution of many more Jews during World War II, large
numbers of Jews began pouring int o Pal es tine when the war
had ended .

The Arabs looked on as world sympathy was lav-

ished upon t he Jews.
say:

Novelist Ge o rge Steiner had t his to

"Any man can say 'Auschwitz,' and if he says it loud

enough , everyone has to cast down his eyes and listen.

It

is like smashing a glass i n the middle of dinner ." 27
By December , 1945, the 75,000 quota issued by the
1939 White Paper had been filled .

No further immigrants

were to be allowed entry unl ess the Arabs approved .

The

British and the Americans decided to send a joint committ ee to Palestine to discuss the sub j e6t of further immigrati on.

In the meantime , 1, 500 immigrants a month were
28
allowed to enter Palestine .
The attitude of the UJiited States towards th e Pale stin e problem h a d been fairly neutral until ·w orl d War II even
though U.S.

p resid~nts

had expressed symp athy for the Jewish

cause and their right to autonomy .

After the war , however ,

the United States was able to make public commitments to
the Jews , due to a new world sympathy directed at the Jews .
In 1944, President Roo sevelt allowed the American
2 7 As quo t ed by Alfred JVI . Lilienthal in "Israel's
Flag is S t ill not Mine , " Middle East Perspective XVI
( October 1983):4
28 Gellner , The Palestine Probl em , p .10 6-108

27
Zionists to state on his behalf that if he were re-elected
he would help bring about the rea li zation of a Jewish commonwea lth .

One year later, Pres ident Roosevelt a l so made

a promise to Ki ng Saud of Saudi Arabia .

Speaking f or the

Americans , he said that no action would be taken tha t was
2
hostile to the Arab pe opl e . 9
I n December , 1945, a resoluti on was passed by the
United S tates Congress concerning Palestine .

The emphasis

was that Palest i ne should be open to Jewish immi grati on in
order to continue gr owi ng in strength as a Jewish nati onal
home , and that Pa l estine shoul d become a democ ratic commonwealth in which all men sha ll have equal rights . 30
After the war ended in 1945 , there were three years
of t ense argument which l ed to the formation o f the state
of Israel in 1948 .
Arabs became more unified in 1945 when Egypt, Iraq ,
Syria , Lebanon , Trans-jordan , Saudi Arabia , and Yemen joined
together to f orm the Arab League .

This organ i za tion ga v e

united Arab representation to the Arab Palestinians .
Wh ile th e Arabs were becoming unified , the S ovi e t
Union cho se thi s moment to pay it s first visit to Pa le stine .
Ivan Ma i sky , Vice-Comissar of F oreign Affairs , was sent to
represent S oviet intere s t s in t he problem of Pa le s tin e .
In Au gus t of the same year , U.S . President Harry S
Truman recommended to Briti sh Prime Minister Clement R .
2 9Ibid , p . 113-114
30 Ibid , p.11 8
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Attlee that 100,000 immigrants be allowed to enter Palestine .
The Arabs reacted negatively tofu.e recommendation and
questioned a possible change in
acts toward Arabs .

u.s.

policy regarding hostile

In return , U . S . Secretary of S tate Byrnes

assured the Arabs that they would be consulted " ••• should
any proposals emerge which in our opinion would change the
basic situa tion in Pe'lestine." 31
In November, 1945, the creation of an Anglo-American
Committee of Inquiry to investigate the Palestine problem
was announced .

Until the committee could make a decision

regarding immigration , the rate of immi gra tion into Palestine
would remain at 1,500 per month.
The Anglo-American Committee published its report in
April of 1946.

It recommended that 100,000 immigrants be

allowed immediate entry into Palestine, but that Palestine
remain neither an Arab nor a Jewish state .
Though grudgingly approved by the <Jews , the recommendations outraged the Ara bs.

The right to decide the question

of further immigration, given them by the 1939 Wh ite Paper,
32
had been revoked without Arab consultation on the matter.
In June, 1946, the Anglo-American Cabinet Committee
was formed to assist the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry .
The new cabinet suggested , as a so lution to the Palestine
problem , that a provincial g overnment, made up of Ara b,
Zionist, and central-governmental districts be se t up in
31 Ibid, p .1 38
3 2 Ibid , p .1 39-144
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Palestine .
In the same month, members of the Jewish Agency Executive in Palestine were arrested af ter they were linked with
terrorist activities.
When Great Britain suggested a London Peace Conference to discuss the Anglo-American Cabinet's plan for a
provincial government in Palestine, the Jewish representatives refused to attend .

They claimed the plan allowed

them too small an area and that they could not be properly
represented at the conference without the members of the
Jewish Agency Executive who were being held for questioning
in Palestine .
The Arabs , likewise, refused to attend because the
British would not accept Amin Husseini , the Mufti of Jerusalem, as a part of the Arab delegation to ;t.he conference. 33
In October , 1946, President Truman expressed a desire
that the 100, 000 immigrants, proposed by the Anglo-American
Committee , by allowed into Palestine.

He further related

his belief that a compromise could be reached between the
Anglo -American provincial government plan and the Jewish
:plan for a. l arger land grant and greater autonomy.
In response to President Truman's statements, King
Saud of Saudi Arabia _wrote a

l~tter

saying that he beli eved

the President had contradicted earlier promises made to the
Arabs .

President Truman disagreed with King Saud .

He said

the promise, that the Arabs woul d be consulted should any
33 Ibid , p . 153-154
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decisions be made affecting the basic situation in Palestine, harl not been viol ated .

The United States did not

believe that 100,000 Jewish immigrants would change the
basic situation in Palestine .
Early in 1947, Great Britain set up a meeting with
Arab and Jewish leaders to discuss possible peace solutions .
Both sides agreed to attend the London Talks.

At these

peace talks, the British suggested that Palestine be divided into J ewish and Arab areas , not necessarily adjoining ,
in which each would have a great amount of autonomy .

A Brit-

ish trusteeship would be termina:f'ed:.... in five' years, a t whic h
time an independent state would be created.

Both Arabs and

Jews rejected this plan.
After the London talks, terrorism broke out anew in
Palestine , directed mainly at the British government .

The

Irgun Zvai Leumi, a Jewish terrorist group, kidnapped two
Britons in Palestine and blew up a police station in Haifa .
To restore order, the British threatened to rule with martial
law, demonstrating their threat by evacuating all British
women and children and s t rengthening their military forces
in Palestine .

The British issued an ultimatum to the Jewish

Agency to cooperate in bringing the terrorists to justice.
When this failed, the British decided to turn the problem
of Palestine over to the United Nations . 34
In November , 1947, the United Nations proposed that
34Ibid , p.160-163

31
Palestine be divided into two s t ates , one Jewish and on e
Arab .

The Arabs rejected the plan .

They said t hat the

Arabs had permanent r i ghts to Pa le stine which res t ed on
the following grounds:
1) The right to dwel l there . They've don so since
the year 3 , 500 B .C. without leaving the country.
2 ) The natural right o f li fe .
3 ) The existence th erein o f the Holy Land .
4 ) The Arabs are not aliens in
Pa l estine and ther e is no intention to bring any of
them from oth er pa r t s of the worl d to sett le th ere. 3 5
They further stated tha t the Jewish claim t o Pa l estine was
unfound ed ,

11

for to occupy a country and then l ea ve it

entitl es no nation to claim and demand ownership th ere of.
36
The history of the world is full of s uch examples . "'
In May , 19 4 8 , after much deliberation, th e Jews
agreed to accept the United Nati ons' plan for Palestine
and establ ished the state of Israel on t he l and assigned
them by the United Na tions .
35 rbid , p .11 4
36 Ibid

CHAPTER III
THE PALESTINIANS AFTER THE PROCLAMATION OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL
(1948-1984)
After the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, a
little less than 1 ,000 , 000 Palestinian Arabs were either
forced to leave Palestine or left of their own accord .
Several Arab states , having become independent, joined the
Palestinians to fight the new Jewish state .
the war, Israel controlled 75% of Palestine .

By the end of
Egypt and

Jordan had the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of Jordan. 37
In the early 1950's, refugees from what had become
Israel began raiding the new state .

Instead of attacking

the elusive Palestinians, the Israelis retaliated with
attacks against the Arab countries .
When Nasser , Egypt's Prime Minister, asked Western
nations for arms to defend his country against the Israelis ,
he was refused.
the United

St~tes

a dam in Egypt .

Because Nasser turned to Russia for aid,
withdrew a previous offer to help build
This initiated the polarization of the

United States from Egypt and the Arab world.
Nasser reacted to U.S. actions by seizing the Suez
Canal from France and Great Britain.

In October, 1956,

37For map of P~lestine, see page 33 .
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Great Britain, France , and Israel responded by invading
Egypt .

Pressure from the United S tate s and Russia forced

these countries to withdraw from Egypt, ,-a:ud a United Nations
peace-keeping force was stationed along the Israeli border.
Although Israel had attacked Egypt as a result of the
Palestinian controversy, the war between Israel and Egypt
was destined to become a private warfaxe, having little to
d o with the cause of the Pales tinians.
After 1956, Palestinians began to lessen their allegiance to pan-Arab groups and to emphasize self-reliance .
They created a guerilla group known as Al-Fatah to enable
them to fight for their rights.

This new self-reliance

stemmed largely from a lack of successful acti on on the
part of the Arab states .
Whi l e the Palestinians were looking inward to their
own strength, other Ara bs were busy converting the Palestinian cause into an issue of inter-Arab politics. · " AbdulKarim Qassim of Iraq publicly committed himself to the
establishment of a Palestinian entit'y ••• ;"

38

whi le the Arab

states pledged a deeper commitment to the Palestinians in
1964 at the First Arab Summi t Conference .

At the conference ,

the Arabs adopted "practical resolutions necessary to ward
off the existing Zionist danger in the technical and defense
fi e lds and to organize th e Pa lestinian people to enable them
to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and
38 Rashid Hamid , "What is the P.L.O.? , " Journal of
Palestinian Studies IV ( Summer 1975):92
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determining their destiny .-" 39

Ahmad Shuqairy , represen-

tative of the Palestinians at the Arab League, toured the
Arab countries publicizing the Palestine Nationa l Council
to be summoned in Jerusalem in May of 1964.

At this meeting ,

the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) was proclaimed.

Al-Fatah became a part of this organization.

In 1967, the Arabs , believing that the Israelis
planned a major attack on Syria , sent military forces into
the Sinai Peninsula .

These Arab forces blocked the Strait

of Tiran, which was the entrance to an important Israeli
port.

The Israelis considered this an act of war, and , in

the next six days, Israeli planes almost completely destroyed
the air forces of Egypt , Syria , and Jordan.

Israel seized

Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip , the West Bank from
Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria .
Six-Day War ended in a U.N. cease-fire.

The so-called
The Arabs said

that they would recognize Israel if it gave up the occupied
lands , but Israel wanted negotiations.

By negotiating,

Israel hoped to retain control of the occupied territories.
In September, 1970, Pa l est i nians living in the West
Bank of Jordan expressed displeasure with their political
status in Jordan.

The Jordanians, in return, resented the

fact that the Palest inians had become so s trong , for the
Palestinians were almost joint rulers of Jordan.

This

problem ballooned into a Palestinian rebellion against the
39UAR , Ministry of National Guidance, Document s and
Pa pers on the Palestine Question (Cairo: Ministry of National Guidance, 1969), p.1373
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Jordanian Bed o uin combat troops .

King Hussein of Jordan ,

determined to end the rebellion , instructed his wel l -trained
army to fire heavily upon the Palestinian guerillas positioned outside of their refug e e camps .

About 2 , 000 people ,

m6st of whom were Pa l estinians , died in the incident known
as Black September .
On October 6 , 1973, in what was known later as th e
October War, Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and fought
ma j or battles with the Israelis on the Si-nai Peninsul a and
on the Golan Heights .

Cease-fires ended most fighting by

November , and in 1974 , Arab and Israeli forces agreed to
separate .

In 1975 , Israel withdrew its troops from the

far western Sinai .

President Sada t of Egypt and Israeli

Prime Minister Begin began discussing an end to the conflict in 19 7 7 . 40
The outcome of tbe

Egyp tian - Is~aeli

war greatly

affected the Palestinian issue , for the maj ority of the
Pa l estinian refugees lived on t he West Bank and the Gaza
Strip .

However , the war itself was n o t waged on behalf o f

that issue .

In actualit y, the war served to is ol ate Egypt

from the Pa l estinian prob l em as the Egyptians concentra t ed
on the issue of Israe l i settlements on the Sinai Peninsula .
I n 19 7 4 , t he P . L . O. was recognized by t he United Nati ons as the officia l represent ative of t he Pal es t inians .
In 1978 , President Sadat , Prime Minister Begin , and
4°w o rld Bo ok Encyclopedia , s . v . "Middle East , " by
Sydney N. Fisher , 1984

37
President Carter held discussions at Camp David in the
United States .
following:

The Camp David Accords called for the

Israel's withdrawal from all of the Sinai ,

autonomy for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank , a freeze
on West Bank settlements, and a peace treaty between Egypt
and Israel.

This peace treaty was signed in 1979, at which

time Israel partial l y withdrew from the Sinai . 41
In order to support the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty,
the United States designed a financial aid package to assist
the two countries.

This package provided Israel with $ 3

billion, of which $800 million was to cover costs for relocation of two Israeli airbases built on l and to be returned
to Egypt .

The rest, $ 2 . 2 billion, would finance foreign

mi li tary sa le s credit and other Israeli relocation cost s.
Eg~pt

was provided $1 . 8 billion;

$ 1.5 billion in military

sales credit financing and $ 300 million in economic aid
loans. 42
·
Alt hough the Camp David Accords and the ensuing peace
treaty formed an exce ll ent framework for peace in the rlliddle
East , they did littl e to solve the Palestinian issue.

An

agreement under Article III of the Eeyptian-Israe li plan
for peace prevented either party from participating in the
organization of activities hostile to the security of the

4· 1 Ibid

42President Carter as quoted in "Middle East:

U.S .
Support for the Egyptian-Israell Peace Treaty ," Department
of S t ate Bull e ti n , May 1979, p.59

38
the other par t y . 4 3

This meant that the Egyptians would

be unable to help any Palestinian group , such as the P . L . O.,
desiring the right to se l f-determination , for a Palestinian
s t ate , according to the Israelis , would threaten Israel's
security .
The P . L . O. had been fighting the Israelis across the
borders of southern Lebanon since the mid-19 70's. until they
agr eed in·,198 1 to cease firing into Israel for a year .
Claiming that the P . L . O. had resumed firing , the Israelis
invaded Lebanon in 1982 to try to wipe out P . L . O. forces .
To prevent the Palestinians from being s l aughtered , the
United States , Italy , and France sent troops to oversee
their safe depart ure from Lebanon .

Many P . L . O. members

were transported to Tunisia , Syria , and Jordan .

The U. S .,

French , and Ita l ian troops left a month later but had to
return, along with British troops, after Israeli forces
had allowed Lebanese Christian forces to massacre around
750 Palestinians in two of their refugee camps .

The troops

from Italy , France , the Unite d States, and Great Britain ,
known as the Multi-National Force,

sta ~ ed

in Lebanon as

a peace-keeping force to allow the country to rebuild its
economy .

All of these forces had withdrawn by April of

1984 , leaving Lebanese , Syrian, and Israeli troops in
L e b anon . 44
4 3"Treaty of'Peace Between the Arab Republic of
Egypt and the State of Israel , " Department of S tate Bu l l etin ,
May 1979 , p . 4
44·Ibid
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In March , 1983, Yasir Arafat , the leader of the
P.L . O., traveled to Jordan to talk with King Hussein
about President Reagan's Se ptember First , 1982, Peace
Initiative .

The initiative called for an immediate freeze

on Israeli Wes t Bank settlement and self-government by
the Pa l estini ans of the West Bank and Gaza in association
with Jordan .

The initiative was against a Pa l estinian

state in t he Wes t Bank and Gaza and Israeli annexati on o r
permanent cont r ol of these t erritories .

Though the

r e s~lt~

of th e Ara f a.t-Hussein meeting were inconclusive, "there
were indications that the two l eaders were striving for a
compromise formula that would try to bridge th e Reagan
initiative and the plan appr ove d by 20 l eaders at t he
. t 1n
. F ez , Mo r occo
Ara b S umm1·

l ast c~ep
·t ember . n 4 5
~

The Fez

plan called for the creati on of an independent Pa l estinian
state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Most recent developments have been an enormous split
in P . L.O . lo yalties and Syrian attempts to replace Ara fat
as leader of the P . L . O.

In May , 1983 , some P . L . O. members

protested when Ara fat promoted several controversial c ommanders within Al -Fatah , the guerilla group which sti ll ' has
ab out

80~

of"the P . L . O.' s strength .

The rebels a l s o b l amed

Arafat f or their departure from Lebanon and criticized him
for what they regarded as a moderate line of negotiation
with Israe l.

The rebe llion spread t hrough th e summer months,

45Marguerite Johns on, "Time for a Decision," Time,
April 1983, pp.34-35
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encouraged by Syrian President Assad who was enraged that
Arafat would discuss President Reag an's September First
initiative .

Assad forced Arafat to le ave Damascus and

soon pushed the P .L.O. chieftain's loyal troops out of
Lebanon's Bekka Valley and into Tripoli, a port city in
Lebanon .

In November , P .L.O. rebels, backed by Syrian

tro o ps, besieged loyal P .L.O. members stationed in th e
Pa le stinian refugee camp of Baddawi from their rebel base
outsid e Baddawi .

After the rebels overtook the refugee

camp, Saud i Arabia arranged a cease-fire with Syria on
behalf

o~

the Pa le stinians .

The day after the publication of the cease-fire
agreement, Arafa t managed a lopsided exchange of Israeli
and Ar ab prisoners .

In return for six Israeli prisoners,

Israel would release 4 ,500 Pa lestini an and Lebanese soldiers captured during the war in Lebanon.

46

In l ate December , 1983 , Arafat and his loyal P . L.O .
members l eft Tripo li ab o ard Greek ships bound for Tunisia
and other places still willing to accept the Palestinians .
46 william E . Smith , "Heading off a Disaster , " Time,
December 1983 , pp.156-158
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An attempt has been made to show the present situation
of the Palestinians by means of a historical overview of
Palestine and its inhabitants from 3,500 B .C. to the present.
These basic facts will help to clarify the Palestinian claim
to self-determination and statehood, as well as views opposing this right.

In order to understand why the Pa le s tinians

deserve the right to self-determination and statehood, one
must look at the most important arguments surrounding this
right from the Palestinian point of view.

Tbese arguments

come from Israel , the United States , and the frontline Arab
states of Egypt , Lebanon, Syria , and Jordan and are cited
in Part II:

The Official Perspectives Conc erning the Pal-

estinian Right to Self-determination and Statehood .

PART II:

THE OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVES CONCERNING
THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD

Chapter

IV .
V.
VI.

THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE
THE UNI TED STATES' PERSPECTIVE
THB FRONTLINE ARAB STATES' PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTEH IV
THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE
The fo l lowing are the foremost Israel i views c oncerning the Palestinian right t o self-determi nati on and
statehood .

Below each v i ew is ( a ) the Israeli reasoning

which substantiates its view , and ( b ) the Palestinian
perspective of that view .

The same format will be used

with the United States and the frontline Arab states in
chapters V and VI .
1 . The Palestinians already have a state in Jordan .
(a) In a 1979 summit meeting , General Sharon of
Isra.el introduced the idea t hat Jordan was already a Palestinian state because it had been a part of Palestine as
directed by the United Nations in 1922 .
that over

50 ~

He further stated

of Jordan's population was Pa l estinian; that

did n ot even include the 270 , 000 refugees on the West Bank .
( b ) In 1920 , at the San Remo Conference , the Briti:sh
were given the mandate of Palestine , which included at the
time the state known today as Jordan .

However , t wo months

later , British Prime Minist~r Churchill appointed an Arab
chieftain t o be ruler over modern Jordan .

Si nce then , the

land west of the Jordan River was known as P ~lestine while
the land east of the Jordan River was called Trans-jordan .
~- 3

44
This became the official name in 1946 when the Hashemite
Kingdom of Trans-jordan was granted its independence by
the British .

However , the land west of the Jordan River

is the place from which the Palestinians draw their national identity .

Ask a Palestinian child in a refugee camp

where he is from , and he will gi v e the name of a village
in the state of Israel .

The P§lestinians argue that their

oneness comes not from Jordan, but from a common hist ory
and a common suffering that was shared on the west bank
of the Jordan River . 47
Another probl em with the considerati on o f J o rdan as
a Pal es t inian sta t e a r is e s when one looks a t t he inte rna l
s t ruggl e in J ordan in 19 70 .

Heavy fighting broke out between

Jordanian Bedouin combat troops and Palestinian gu erillas .
The war , which had been brewing since 1968 , was a result
o f resentment on both sides .

The Palestinians refused to

obey the Jordanian gun prohibition and rul ed their own
refugee camps.

On the other hand , King Hussein's govern-

ment did not give the Palestinians sufficient recognition,
as they made up 65% of the popul ation .

In 1974 , at the

Rabat Arab summit , King Hussein of Jordan was forced to
renounce his claim as sp okesman for the Palestinians .
2 . If a Pa l estinian state were i n the West Bank or the
Gaza Strip , the security of Israel would be threatened .
( a ) In a poll taken in 1979 , 89% of the people of
4 7 Martin Ziebell , "Poverty and Cul ture , " Earl ham
Col lege, June 1983

45
Israel opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state
i n the West Bank and Gaza .

48

They believed a Palestinian

state , with its Soviet backing, would be of grave danger ·
to Israel's security .

The artillery with which the Soviet

Uni6n already supplied the Palestinians had a range of
10 , 000 meters .

When one considered that there was only

an S-mile stretch from the West Bank hills across Tel Aviv
to the sea , there was no doubt that every Israeli citizen
would be endangered .

Added to this were the articles in

the P . L.O . Covenant often referred to by the Israelis.
These articles declared null and void the state of Israel
and said that anything other than complete liberation of
Palestine must be rejected and that all Zionist activities
must be stopped .
Israel continued it s argument by saying that even if
the Palestinians were able to establish a state, there was
no guarantee

aga~nst

terrorism .

The instability of the P . L.O.

was certain in light of the recent split due to conflicting
loyalties , not to mention the many vengeful bombings and
hijackings o f f o rmer years .
(b ) In Palestinian opinion, the Israeli threat to
Palest i nian security was a far more serious matter .

Had

the Palestinians ejected the Israelis from Palestine , the
threat to Israeli security might be better understood .
4SSidney Zion and Uri Dan, "Israel's Peace Strategy,"
New York Times rllagazine, April 1979, p . 90
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Instead, a history of suffering at the hands of the Jews
was a story familiar to all Palestinians .
Since the day the Jews drove them from their homeland, the Palest ini ans have lived in the low condidtions
of refugee camps, now located in territbries oc cupied by
Israeli forces .

The 1982 invasion and ensuing massacre of

Pa l estinians in th e Lebanon refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila were further proof that the Palestinians were not safe
from the Israelis.
The most recent threat to Palestini an security lies
in Jewish settl ement d.n the West Bank .

Since 1967, Jews

have been settling in occupied territories, of which the
Wes t Bank is not the l east .

The Israelis are content to

ignore their agreement to implement -the Camp David Accords,
which called for a freeze of further settlement in the
Wes t Bank .

Instead, they favor Begin 's statement in the

Eretz Israel document that Israel should include the West
Bank .

Begin considers, .the land precious to Jewish religious

history and refers to the West Bank by its biblical names
of Samaria and Judea.
It is obvious that Israel intends "to make the occupied
territories dependent on Israel." 49

According to a P . L . O.

official, they are implementing these intentions through·
'' ••• their economic policies, their deportation and harass50
ment of the educated young, and their settlement policy."
4 9Mroz, Beyond Security , p.94
50 Ibid

4-7
The West Bank becomes more dependent on Israe l as
the number o f j obs avai lable t o the Palest i nians on the
West Bank are decreased .

"The Internati unal Labor Organi-

zation noted that be t ween 19 70 and 19 78 there had been a
dr op o f 6 , 000 employed people in the occupied terri to ries ,
whi le the active p opulation there increased by 34 , 600
pe op l e and the number o f Pales t inian ·.wo rkers in Israe l
r o se fr om 20 , 000 to 70 , 000 . "5 1
It was not eno ugh for Israel t o threaten the Pal es tinian ' s security by usurping the land oh. *hirih the Pa l estin i ans had resided for thousands of

years . ~

Now Israel

threatened the very identity of the Pa l estinians .

For , as

Jews moved into the occupied territ o ries , Pa l estini ans were
forced t o find jobs and homes in neighboring countries ,
thus becoming a part o f those countries .
The Palestinians believed that the Israeli fear of
terrorist activities was unfounded .

Although the P . L . O.

l argely pra c ticed terrorism in former years to direct world
attention to their cause , their methods in the 1980 ' s have
been more diplomatic for the most part .

Regardless of

any split in the P . L . O., the Pa lestinians would regard
terrorism as unnecessary when they re ce ive the ri ght t o
se l f-determination .
51
Ibid , p . 93 , Internationa l Labor Office , Geneva ,
" Action taken by the International Labor Off i ce at its
59th to 64th Sess ions , " 19 7 9 , p . 43

I .
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3 . Mo s t Arabs do not want a Pa l estinian state .
( a ) Israel states that the ma jo rity of Arabs are
against t hem and woul d like to drive them into the sea . 52
The desire for territory, say the Israeli s , is mo re important to the Arab wor l d than is the cause of the Pa l es tini ans .
( b ) Though the Pa l estinians believe the majority of
the Arabs are aga i nst the s t ate of Israel , they d o not
believe that t he whole of the Arab world p l ace a the desire
for territ ory ab ove the Pa l estinian cause .

Pro o f of this

can b e found in Arab willingness to provid e homes for th e
Pa l est i nians in their own countries , despi t e the resulting
dama ge to t heir re l a tions with Israel .
Even if this last Israeli al l egation were true, it
would n ot change the Palest i ni an position.
seventh emergency sessi on of the United

In 1980 , in tbe

N~t ions ,

the Assembly

affirmed that the Pale s tinians had , "inalienable rights •••
i ncluding their right to se lf-d eterminatign, and their right
to establish their own independent , s overei gn s t a t e . 1153
The very meaning of self-determinati on denies tb e right o f
the Arab states or anyon e else to t e ll the Pal estinians
what t heir future po li tical

sta tus will be .

52 Mr o z , Beyon d Se curity, p . 2 1
5 3 11 7th Emergency Spec i a l Sessi on ," UN Chronicle ,
Sept ember 1982 , p . 2 7

CHA:PTER V
THE UNITED STATES' PERSPECTIVE
1. The United States will support the sovereignty of the
State of Israel, but will not support establishment of
a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza S trip .
(a ) President Reagan, in the September First Peace
Initiative of 1982 , stressed that the United States would
not support the establishment of a Palestinian state in
the .W est Bank or Gaza , and that it would oppose any negotiations threatening the security of Israel . 5 4

Resolution

242 of the United Nations Security Council, upon which the
former was based , said that inworder to ga in peace in the
Middle Eas t , Israel must withdraw from territories occupied
during the war , and that belligerent claims on territory
must cease whi l e reco gnit ion of every state's right to be
sovereign and have peace must commence . 55

President Reagan

is firmly committed to these two soluti ons for peace in th e
Middle East .

He believes that a peaceful settlement could

be reached if the Pal estinian people were consulted .

Pres-

ident Reagan is convinced that a so l ution will not be reached
by consulting the P . L . O., as they will fight to the death

54K
·~ enne.th- 1.rn . D am,
. • . "A rp
•
for Reason and Realism in
_lme
the l\Uddle Eas t," Department of State Bulletin , June 1983 ,
p . 59
55cordier and Harrelson, Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Na tions, 8 vols . ( New Yo rk:
Columbia University Press, 19 76), 7: 603-604
49

50
for a Pale,stinian stR.te.

He .agrAes with

U.S'. Deputy

ti:ary of ' State Kenneth Dam, who said that ' 11 the 6-dav

5'ecrewar was

forced on Israel by the i mminent threAt of unprovoked R.pgression. " 56
In a · talk with Meg Greenfield, editorial page editor
of the

Washingu~m

Post, on April 24, 1983, U.S. Secret any

of State Shultz commented that

Kin~

Hussein of Jordan would

not join in the Middle East peace talks hecause, among other
reasons, he could oersuade Yasir Arafat to apree upon
representati on at the nevotiations.

He further stated that

he was not sure if the P.L.O. should continue to have the
leadership of the Palestinian oeoole if they were not wflling
to do something constructive when piven opportunitv.
When asked if he would try to contact any Palestinian leaders
while on his impending trio to the Middle East, Shultz replied, "No, I certainly have no olan to meet with anyone from
the P.L.O., if that is what·~you're gettinf."57
(b ) There are two facts which seem to constantJv elude
the United States in its search for peace in the Middle East.
One is the aforementioned idea of
which was forced upon Israel.

the "unprovoked aggress-ion"

When the Jews began to immig-

rate to the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and eRrJy
twentieth centuries, they carried with them the socia1istic
dream of a Utopian state.

No more would there be persecution.

56Dam, "A Time for Reason ..• ", DePArtment of State
Bulletin, June 1983, p.58
57Meg Greenfield, "Secrete1ry's Interview on the Mirldle
East," Department of State Bulletin, June 1983 ,, o. 64
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But when they arrived, there were a lreadv peonle

there~

Some Jews realized then that the moment the Arabs refused
to be a part of their Utopian dream, this Arab dissatisfaction
would ruin any hooe for a oerfect society.
ever, asked themselves if they

~ould

Most Jews, how-

reallv aJlow a few peas-

ants to destroy what was to be their perfect home l a nd in an
age when colonialism prevailed.

The a nswer, which marred

any hope of a Utopia, has echoed across yeArs of bloody
conflict.
Another fact elusive to the United States is thAt the
P.L~O~

is the legitimate represent ative of the Palestinian

people~

Because thfs.fact is elusive to the U.S., decisions

concerning the Palestinians are dealt with by the Arab states,
Israel, and the United States.

A Wes t Bank mayor aske<;i, "'How

can representatives of three foreign

governm~nts,

Egypt, Israel,

and the United States, determine the future of any other

pl~?'"58

The

P.L~O.'s

peo~ 

best known actions have painted a pic-

ture of blood across our television screen, as have many
Israeli actions.

This, and the fact that the

P.L~O.

will

only settle for a Palestinian state, has labeled them as
radicals' in the minds of U,.s. officials.

Meanwhile, Palest-

inian street demonstrations and riots are ignored.
What U.S. officials do not recognize is that the P.L.O.
continues to build hospitals, factories, schools, and a new
computer center, while funding a pension system for families

58Mroz, Beyond Security, p.91
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of those who have died in the conflict and a scholarship
program for university students.

They also run a tax

collection system and a democratic election of the Palestine
National Council.

2. The Palesti nians should hecome an autonomous entity in
confederation with Jordan.
·
(a ) Another of President Reapan ts suggestions was
that the Palestinians should become an autonomous entity
in confedera tion.
main reasons:

The Unit ed States chose Jordan for three

1 )It bordered the West Ba nk, where the major-

ity of the Palestinian refugees are located, 2 ) J ord·an 's
population was 65% Palestinian, a nd J )King Hussein had been
an early spokesman for the Palestinian c a use.
States believed that a confederation would

The United

~ran t

the Pales -

tinians autonomy and freedom from Jewish law, while Jewish
security would he protedted by the stability of the Jordanian
government.
(b) The Palestinians maintained that they would be
diss a tisfied with anthing less than the right to se lf-determina tion.

When as ked about the oossihility of a link with

Jordan, P.L.O. leader Yasir Arafat As ked, "Why don't ti-J.e
Americans support self-determination for the Palestinians?
Last Y''e ar the y ba cked se lf-determinatio n for 2, 000 people on
the Falkland Islands.

So why do they refuse the same prin-

ciple fo r: 5 million Palestinians ?tt59

Despite Arafat 's harsh

59Roberto Sura, "It is Ver y , Very Serious ," Time, <July

1983, p.35
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words, he, along with the majority of the Palestinians,
expresses interest in a confederation with Jordan after
the Palestinians have been pranted statehood&
In reply to the American usage of the words ''entity"
and "confederationu . to des-cribe the future Palestinian
political status, two PalAstinian opinions are given.
Upon finding the word entitv in Webster's Dictionary, a
Palestinian was diseusted to discover that its meaning
was uexistence 11 or "being".

u'It means we will be given
60
. t ence ?.... No, tan
h k you ••• we a 1 rea d y ex1st.
.
I u
our ex1s
As far as becoming part of a confederation with Jordan,
a Palestinian businessman said, '''Tell me what confederations
in history have been so

estab~ished

••• and what ever hannerted

to your Western doctrine that sovereign states make up a
61
confederation?'''
Jordanian officials, remembering the
1970 civil war,

ag~ee

that before a confederation can take

place, the issue of Palestinian statehood must be confronted.

3. A clash between the United St a tes and the Soviet Union
must be avoided.
(a) TTFrom 1968 to September 1973 the Soviet Union sent
the Arab States 2,603 million dollars worth of arms.

During

that same period the United States sent the Arab States
million dollars worth of arms ••• "62 According to

u.s.

~03

Deputy

60 Ibid, p. 169
6.1 Ibid , p. 169 , 170
6~Martin Gilbert Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, , Inc., 1974), p.63
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SecretRry of St Pte KennPth Dam, one of the Unit e d St a tes'
primar y co ncerns' with its involvement in the Middle Eas t
6
is the Prevention of a conflict between super-powers. 3
· Should there be a Pa le s tini a n s t a te, the cha nce for wa rf a re would gre Rtly increase.
(b) The Pal~stinians do not feel thAt the threat of
war will increase should they become a n independent state.
Most believe tha t Palestinian violence against Isr ae l will
end once they are r iven freedom to exercise their

ri~ht

to

se]f~determina tion.

6

3 K·ennet h Dam, ·-·
ttA T·lme ..f or
State Bulletin, June 1983, p.57

R ea son •••

,- " D
.. epar t me n t o f

CHAPTER VI
THE FRONTLINE ARAB STATES ' PERSPECTIVE
1.

Tho~gh most Arabs publicly exoress a desire for a Palestinian state, reasons for wanting this state differ.

(a) The states of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt ~ have all
agreed on one point:
self-determination.

the Palestinians have the right to
Lebanon is non-committal on this

subject.
King Hussein of Jordan, at one time an official
spokesman for the Palestinians, displayed his loyaltv to
the Palestinian _cause by refusing to join any peace talks
until the United States 1 )recognized the Palestinian right
to self-determination, and 2lallowed the P.L.O. to join him
at the peace talks.

The Jorda nian king agrPed with the

Palestinians tha t there could be no Palestinian conFederation
with Jordan without first r ranting the Palestinians statehood.
A confederation without st atehood would no doub t result in
another Palestinian-Jordanien civil war.
Hussein is also supportive of a freeze on Israeli
settlement in the West Bank.

He Bven went so far as to

write a United Nations resolution to this effect and requested
the U.S. to back the resolution.

When the U.S, refused, Hus-

sein angrily accused that nation of failing to supnort President Reagan's September First initiative which called for an
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Israeli settlement freeze. 64
Hussein resented Israeli Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon's claim that the Palestinians already had a state
in Jordan.

This suggestion, which imPlied thAt Hussein

should turn the Jordanian government over to the Palestinians,
caused a Jordanian politician with close ties to the king _
to say, "If we do not force the IsrAelis to negotiAte about
the West Bank now, they will force us to negotiate over the
East Bank 1Ater." 6 5
Although Syrian President Assad agrees that the Palestiniaps have a right to self-determinAtion, his recent
actions have shown his determinAtion to make Palestinian
rights subservient to Syrian interests.

When Syrian troops

entered Lebanon in 1976, to help control a civil WAr, they
purposefully supported the Christian rightists against the
P.L.O., who supported the Lebanese Moslem leftists.

Syria

was accused then by the fedayeen, or peasant Palestinians,
o~an anti-Palestinian olot. 66 The plot thickened when
Assad backed an anti-Arafat rebellion with Syrian trooos
and tanks.

~While

Assad saw the PAlestinian cause as subor-

dinAte to his wider vision of Arab unity, ArafAt believed
that the P.L.O. must remain independent of any ArAb nAtion."()?
64Douglas Watson, "Why Jordan's Hussein Plays Spoiler
Role," U.S. News Rnd World Report, April 19R4, p.49
6 5Marguerite Johnson, "Time for a Decision," Time,
April 1983, p.35
66 "A Shaky Compromise in Lebr:mon," Time, June 1976, p.24-26
67 James Kelly, "Bidding for a Birger Role," Time, December 1983, P.34
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The Soviet Union, who signed a peace treaty with
Syria in 1980, has given military equipment to Syrians
and Palestinians.

The Sovie t opposes th e break in relations

between Arafat and Assad.
Syria joined Jordan in opnosing the Reagan September
First initiative, but for different reasons.

Assad was

against the initiative because it ivnored Syria ' s ambition
for a major po litical role in the Arab reeion by denying
Syria a voice at the peace talks.
Despite the fact that the P. L.O. severed relations
with Egypt in 1979 after Egypt sipned a neace treaty with
Israel, Egyptian President Mubarak is fAvorable to a Palestinian state.

In an interview with Time magazine, Mubarak

advised the United States to stop Israeli settlement in the
West Bank before there was nothing left to negotiate.

He

called on .. Hussein to convince other Arab leAders to allow
the Palestinians to join the negoti a tions for peace.

He

also asked thAt ArafAt recognize Israel's right to exist as
a nation in return for Israeli recognition
right to self-determination.

o~

the Palestinian

Mubarak told the Time i_nter-

viewer that he believed that Israel could live in Peace with
the Palestinians if they would stop being obstinate and give
the Palestinians their rights.
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PerhaPs because of the Time interview, Yasir Arafat,
in December of 1983, made the first official Palestinian

68

"An Interview with Mubarak," Time, January 19R3, n.4R

visit to Egypt since 1978.

Upon Arafat's arrival,

Presid~nt

Mubarak hailed him as "a stru)!gler and a moderate leader of
the Palestinians whd are struggling to re)!ain the
rights of the Palestinian peonles." 6 9

or

legitim~te

the frontline stPtes, Lebanon alone withholds aPP-

roval of the Pa l esti nian right to self-determination.

The

reason for this is certainly related to Lebanese President
Bashir Gemayal's belief that the P.L.O. bears a moral responsibility for the civil war in Lebanon.

Twice, within four- \

teen months, the P.L.O. was expelled from Lebanon.

Gemayel

a llowed other Palestinians to stay , but said he would no
70
longer tolerate their being a state within a state.
(b) Lurking behind the comraderie of some of the
Arab states, the Palestinians sense

betr~yal.

An Israeli

Cabinet minister renortedly spoke with U.S. Secretarv of
State Vance, who told him that, ·m Efynt,

Jorda~,

S'a udi Arabia,

a nd Syria were against the establishment of a Palestinian
state, no matter what they said nuhlicly."7 1 The Palestinians
suspect they are not only fighting Israelis, but Arabs ,gs
well.

Sine~

1948, more Palestinians have b een killed by Arabs

than by Jews.
The most auspicious of possible Palestinian enemies
69
"Arafat Embrnces Mubarak in Cairo in Reconcilintion,"
New York Times, December 1983, sec. 1, pp.A1,A8
70 Wilton Wynn, "The Job: Rebuild a Country," Time,
September 1982, p.31
7 1 Zion and Dan, nisr-ael ' s Peace Stratep-y," New York
Times Map-azine, April 1979, P.90
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among the Arabs is Syria.

In Damascus, a senior P.L.O.

. . 1 sa1. d , ·"A ssa d I s pr1ce
•
f
o ff 1c1a
_or
goo d re l a t.1ons w1. th th e
P.L.O. has been the same for years.

Syria must have a

large, and if possible, commanding sav over the P.L.O.'s
political direction." 72 The Pa l estinians beliPve that Syria
is intent on seizing control of the Palestinian movement,
in order that it might gain political cower under the puise
of helping the Palestinians.

This desire for control is

easi l y seen in Assad's attemnt to overthrow Arafat in the
summer of 19g3.

Even though Assad claimed to be aiding the

Palestinian cause by ridding the P.L.O. of Arafat, a

noll

conducted in East Jerusalem after the P.L.O. split showed
73
that 92 % of the people surveyed were loyal to Arafat.

2. Arab op ~1n1ons differ concernine: the decision to recognize
of Israel's right to exist as a nation.
(a ) Syria refuses to recogni~e Israel and demands the
return of the Golan Heights which Israel seized in the 1967
war and annexed in 19g1.
Jordan does not reco gnize Israel due to close ties with
the P.L.O., whose official position is one of non-recornition.
Since Lebanon and Egypt wanted to sign peace treaties
with Israel, recognition of the Jewish state was imperative.
(b) The Palestinians have settled on a comnromise cnncerning recognition of the state of Israel.

They

h~ve

not

7 2 Marguerite cTohnson, "Fac ine- Syria 's Challenges,"
Time, July 19g3, p.25
73Ibid
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made a public announcement to the effect tha t they will
reco g nize Israel; however, at the Arab Summit in Fez in
September of 1982, the P.L.O. and Arab states acknowledged
Israel indirectly by refraining from publicly denouncing
Israel as an ille gitima te state.
The Palestinians have a reason for refusing direct
reco gnition of Israel.

If the Palestinians reco g nize

Israel as a state, they wi l l have nothing left with which
to bargain.

Said former We st Bank mayor Karim Khalaf,

"This is the l 2st ca rd.

Arafat is ready for

peace~

When

he sits down with Israe l to negotiate--this is recognition." 74
The Palestinians will reco g nize Israel when Isra el is ready
to recog nize the Palestinian ri g ht to self-determination and
statehood.
74
·chaim Shur a nd Liora Barash, "Ka rim Khalaf : 'U ..N.
Resolutions Are the Bes t iJ'Tay to Peace, '" New Outlook: Middle
East Monthly,February 1984, p.S

CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to show that the Palestinians
have a right to self-determination and statehood.

Arguments

against this right have been weighed carefully with Palestinian scales and are found

wantin~.

Both the Palestinians and the Israelis believe that
their arguments concerning Palestinians rights are just.
Therefore, how can there ever be a resolution bf the Palestinian conflict?
The Palestinians believe the ri?ht to self-determination
is theirs because they share a common history and suffering,
because

t~ey

were forced to leave the land on which they had

resided for centuries, and hec8use there Are over 4,000,000
peopl e who have to have a home.
Establishment of a Palestinian state can only become
reality, say the Palestinians, if Israel and the United
States will recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of
the Palestinians and will allow the P.L.O. a voice in the
peace talks.

The Palestinians also claim that a freeze

on West Bank settlements is vital to a neaceful solution.
Israel does not agree that the Palestinians should
have the right to self-determination.

The Israelis believe

that the Palestinians alreadv have a st8te in Jordan.
is also persuaded that most Arabs are avainst
state.

Why, then, should they risk
61

allowin,~

A

a

Israel

Palestinian
Palestinian
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state to exist which would threaten their security7
The Israelis believe the conflict would be solved
if the Palestinians were absorbed by other Arab countries
or if Jordan would consent to share its g oyer nment with the
Palestinians.
Other opinions concerning the Palestinian right to
self-determination, such as those fiven by the United States
and the frontline Arab states of

Egypt~

Jordan, Syria, and

Lebanon, could be helpful or detrimental to a oeaceful resolution of the conflict.
The United States has alienated the Palestinians by
supporting Israel's sovereignty, while withholding supnort
for a Palestinian state.

This pledge to Israel and the

United States' fear of a clash with the Soviet Union, have
greatly immobilized U.S. involvement in a peaceful solution
for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The frontline Arab states have showed themselves ready
to defend, ignore, and control the outcome of the Palestinian
situation.

Jord~n

and Egypt, especially the former, have

openly supnorted the Palestinian right to self-determination.
Both call for recognition of the P.L.O. as the legitimate
sppkesman for the Palestinians and see the need for IsraeJ
to stop settling in the West Bank.

Lebanon has been emhit-

tered by the Palestinian involvement in its civil war, and
therefore, ignores the Palestinian cry for Arab support.
Syria, in a play for power, has tried to control the outcome
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of the Palestinian situation by sunporting rebellion within
the P.L.O.
The time factor nlays a vital role in a neaceful resolution.

If Syria succeeds in controlling the P.L.O., any

steps toward peace which Arafat has already taken will be
annulled ~

Also, the Pa lestinians will have lost any chance

for le gitimate representation by the P.L.O.
Another time problem revolves around Israeli settl e ment in the Wes t Bank.

These settlements are bei ng constructed

so quickly, that if a few years, there will be no land left
with which to

ne ~ otiate.

Clearly, any action concerning the neaceful resolvement
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be taken immedi a tely.
The people of the United States could hold the key to this
resolution.

A poll taken in 1977 and agaln in 19S2 . showed

that U.S. citizens are becoming more favorable to a Pales75
tinian state.
A change in the U.S. policy which refuses
to support a Palestinian state will only occur if U.S. citizens
are willing to pressure their congressmen to amend the policy.
Should U.S. policy

ch~nge,

the Israelis mi ght he per-

suaded to meet with the P.L.O. under the umbrella of the
United Nations.

Since the U.N. has already reco pnized the

Palestinian right to self-determination, U.N. involvement
could result in Palestinian statehood.
All of this conjecture can become reality if neople
75connie DeBoer, "The Polls: The Arab-Israeli Conflict,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1983, p.125
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will recognize that the Pal e stinians are not merely flealike nuisances, but that they have a lepitimate
self-determination and statehood.
worl d look a t the

ri~ht

to

When the oeonle of the

Palestinian-Isr ~ eli

conflict from the

Palestinian viewpoint, they will understand when people
like Palestinian author Fawaz Turki say, "I was a Palestinian
and the name had a cadence to it.

I was not the bewildered,
wretched native of the land; I was the native son. 1176
76 Fawaz Turki, The Disinherited: Journal of a Pal~stinian Exile, ( London: Monthly Press Review, 1972)
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